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Before The Americal: Task Force 6814
and Saving America’s Asian Empire, 1940-1942
Roger R. Thompson, PhD
(Copyright 2020 Roger Thompson)

(Contributing Editor’s Note: Before the Americal in Vietnam was the historic formation
of the Americal on New Caledonia after it arrived as Task Force 6814. But what were the
conditions that shaped the Task Force to come to that part of the world which sealed the
legacy of the Americal as a jungle-fighting infantry division? This article gives you the
unique background to what was to become “The Americal Story.”)

Introducing Walter Walt

Walter W. Walt, Jr. (1916-2006) served in the Americal Division from the
moment it was created in New Caledonia in May 1942. Drafted in October
1941, and inducted into active service on 17 November, Walt was in training in
Virginia as Task Force 6814 was forming in mid-January 1942. A Californian, he
was assigned to the Massachusetts National Guard’s 101st Medical Regiment,
Company I. Task Force 6814, which included the 182nd Infantry Regiment
(Massachusetts) and the 132nd Infantry Regiment (Illinois), embarked from New
York in late January 1942, reached Australia in late February, and landed at New
Caledonia on 12 March 1942.) The task force was joined in April by the 164th
Infantry Regiment (North Dakota). With these three National Guard infantry
regiments at its core, the Americal Division was established in May 1942 on New
Caledonia under the leadership of Task Force 6814 commander Alexander Patch.
General Patch, and Walt’s unit, arrived on Guadalcanal in early December 1942
with the last echelon of the Americal Division to reach the still-embattled island.
Walt, who was awarded the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, left Guadalcanal on
25 May 1943 for the United States. He, like General Patch, went on to serve in
the European Theater. Walt was discharged from active duty on 12 August 1945.

Dawn in the Pacific

We saw Walter from our room at the Royal Hawaiian, a solitary figure on the
empty beach at Waikiki, watching another dawn in the Pacific. My wife Melissa’s
first instinct was to rush down to her 83-year-old father and make sure he would
be OK, but she left him to his thoughts and solitude. We were on holiday with
Walter, and his wife Dorothy, who had invited us to join them as they celebrated
their 50th wedding anniversary in 1999.
We did all the usual tourist activities, including a trip to the USS Arizona
memorial at Pearl Harbor. All was going smoothly as we pulled into the parking
lot, when quietly and firmly, Walter and Dorothy said: “We’ll wait for you here.
You two go on. We’ll be fine.” We gently protested, but to no avail. Nothing
more was said, then or later. Why wouldn’t they join us? I’ve been trying to
answer that question ever since. I still have questions for Walter and Dorothy, but
like so many of their generation, time has silenced their voices. As I write this in
April 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, I cannot even visit my father,
my first World War II vet. But we still talk, and I continue to ask questions.
“The Pacific War” is one of the courses I teach at Western Washington
University. Every time I teach this course I think about Walter, who served in the
South Pacific in 1942-43, and I think about Dorothy, whose first husband was killed
in action in the Pacific. I also think about the sixteen million Americans who wore
a uniform during World War II, and I think about a civilian population mobilized
for “total war.” I think about the estimated seventy million persons, military and
civilian, who perished in the war; at least a third of these deaths were in Asia,
where millions starved to death. The scale of World War II is almost too much to
imagine. And so when I teach the Pacific War, I also try to make it personal for my
students. We start with their family histories; I sometimes share a few of Walter’s
stories. Shortly before he died in 2006, Walter brought out for the last time-although we did not know that--his World War II album. Full of photographs
and other items, Walter’s album was clearly a labor of love, and an object of great
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meaning and significance to him.
Our visits were too short, and
Walter and I never had enough time
to spend together with his album.
And he rarely talked about the war.
He still suffered from malaria; he
had nightmares. But for the most
part his memories were kept private.
Walter was not unusual; America’s
World War II veterans often put the
war behind them and focused their
energies on families and careers as the
post-war boom began in the 1950s.
When I began dating Walter’s
daughter in 1975, his war was only
three decades distant. The fall of
Saigon had just brought to a tragic
end America’s role in Vietnam. I was
a freshman at Stanford University
and I rarely mentioned my four years
in the Air Force; I never talked about
what I did in northern Thailand during
the Vietnam War. But I did share this
with Walter; I thought it might be a
way for us to connect. Perhaps it did,
but it is also possible Walter might not
have understood why anyone would
enlist. He was drafted when he was
twenty-five, and went on active duty
just before Pearl Harbor, one of the
million or so men drafted in the first
fifteen months of America’s first peacetime draft; And then, Pearl Harbor.
We served America in Asia in two very
different wars, Walter and I, but it was
a bond.
About forty-five years after we met,
and over a decade after Walter’s death,
the time had come to go to the storage
locker where Melissa and I had placed
the boxes we packed up after Walter’s
death in 2006. I had remembered a
large envelope with an inscription in
Walter’s hand that I thought was warrelated. Last summer I located it--the
envelope read “Contents: Letters sent
home from service in army, Ribbons
etc., Discharge copy”--brought it
home, and opened it up for the first
time. There was a small envelope
with medals and patches, including a
patch with a striking design: a cluster
of four white stars in a cross design on
a dark-blue background. And then the
treasures Walter had never mentioned
to his son Christopher or his daughter
Melissa: Two letter-diaries written to
his mother before and after his service
in New Caledonia and Guadalcanal.

The first letter, dated 20 January 1942, was written the day
Walter boarded the St. Elena, one of the seven ships of Task
Force 6814 soon to leave the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The last
letter is dated 21 June 1943 and describes Walter’s arrival
back in the United States after his long voyage across the
Pacific from Guadalcanal to San Francisco.
But there were no letters from New Caledonia and
Guadalcanal. Could I fill in this gap, I wondered, from March
1942 to May 1943? I had the album photos and ephemera
from his time on the two islands, but little else. In ways that
have astounded me in recent months, I found I could indeed
fill in these gaps. And when I completed this extraordinary
journey, I discovered that Walter and I shared the experience
of two young Americans in Asia that links his service in New
Caledonia with my tour in Thailand. We were connected by
the French, their empire, and the United States that first came
together in fateful ways in 1940. The consequences of that
fraught relationship continued until 1975, transforming in
turn my generation. One early consequence is the Americal
Division, the only infantry division formed and trained
overseas on foreign soil and the United States Army’s only
“named” division. The Americal Division, book-ended by
Task Force 6814 in World War II and Task Force Oregon in
the Vietnam War, has an extraordinary history that resonates
in profoundly important ways in the histories of the United
States, Asia, and the world. Let us turn to these histories.

Globalizing the European Conflict

In May 1940, Germany attacked France and the French
state and military soon sued for peace. The Vichy regime,
beholden to Berlin, took power on 10 July1940. Germany,
Italy, and Japan formalized their military alliance with
the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. The
European crises was now a global crisis as the Japanese and
Italian empires established common cause with Germany,
whose empire had vanished two decades earlier under the
terms of the Treaty of Versailles. German imperial ambitions
had now returned to dominate the world stage two decades
after the Great War; once again a world war loomed.
Although the French state had surrendered to German
might, the French empire and diplomatic and military
forces abroad had not. Diplomats, admirals, and generals,
including one Charles de Gaulle, had to decide whether or not
the newly-established Vichy government was the legitimate
representative and defender of French sovereignty. Most
obeyed orders from Vichy, but de Gaulle was one of the
“Free French” contenders who did not. He would become,
eventually, the symbol of Free French resistance to Hitler’s
Germany. And while there was not much de Gaulle could
do in France itself, he had all of the French empire to appeal
to in the dark days of 1940. French colonial officials and
military leaders throughout their empire tended to hew to
the lines established by the Vichy administration in France-French Indochina is a good example--but de Gaulle’s
blandishments resonated with some of the French empire’s
imperial subjects.
Britain and the United States, with their own empires
to protect around the world, turned to the people and
democratic principles of self-government as they sought to

prise pieces of the French empire from Vichy influence. If the
people, in free elections, decided to align their colony with
the Free French, then both countries were willing to recognize
the people’s voice as the crucial legitimating factor in these
high-stakes struggles for sovereignty in a fracturing world.
In the South Pacific, this obscure but pivotal process would
involve Britain, the United States, Japan, Vichy France, and
the Free French in dramatic and fateful ways in 1940 and
1941. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is
just one part of this very complicated story.

A Shadow Diplomatic War in Asia

The shadow diplomatic war of 1940-41, when none of
these protagonists was at war with one another, anticipated
the global war to come. In China, where Western empires
had acquiesced in Japan’s expansion of its Asian empire
in 1931 when it took Manchuria, the West continued to
recognize and work with the Japanese government and
military that had occupied much of northern and coastal
China after its undeclared war with China began in July
1937. Japan tolerated the continuing Western presence in
China, most notably in Shanghai, even as its anti-imperialist
and anti-Western rhetoric became shrill.
As would
General Petain in Vichy France, China’s Wang Jingwei
took power in Nanjing (30 March 1940), near Shanghai,
and collaborated with Japanese authorities as he headed
the Reorganized National Government of China. Unlike
General de Gaulle, however, “Free China’s” leader Chiang
Kai-shek commanded significant, but beleaguered military
forces from his wartime capital deep in China’s interior at
the Yangzi River treaty port of Chongqing (Chungking) in
Sichuan province. Elsewhere in Asia, Japanese and Western
imperialists also eyed one another warily. Even in French
Indochina, nominally under Vichy control in 1940, French
colonial authorities accommodated Japanese demands with
reluctance since imperial competitions were always ones
with clear winners and losers. Except for “semi-colonial”
China, where all imperialist powers had once agreed to
cooperate, sovereignty in Asian colonies was held by the
nation-states located in the West or Japan.
Sovereignty and legitimacy, then, were key elements
in the shadow war of 1940-41. The rules of war and
diplomacy still guided policy-makers. French diplomats
sent to Washington, D.C., by their Vichy government were
accredited and received in the halls of power. Americans
travelling to French colonies obtained visas from the Vichy
government; the United States government dealt with
General de Gaulle with great discretion. But there was
one part of the French empire where significant exceptions
were made for reasons of grave geo-political importance:
the South Pacific. After 1919, and the Treaty of Versailles,
Japan had been granted League of Nations mandates for
Germany’s island colonies and areas north of the equator;
Western imperialists shared the German spoils of war south
of the equator.
From these starting positions in China and the Pacific,
Japan extended its influence to the northern part of French
Indochina in 1940 (a year earlier it had taken control of
Hainan, a Chinese island near China’s southeastern coast,
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and quickly established air assets that could strike at all of French Indochina).
From Indochina, all of Britain’s southeast Asian possessions (Malaya, Singapore,
and Burma) were at risk. And to the south lay the Dutch East Indies, Australia,
and New Zealand. None of these imperial possessions could survive without
protection from either Great Britain or the United States. And the United States’
air and sea lines-of-communication with Australia and New Zealand cut through
the South Pacific. The South Pacific mattered.

A Shadow Diplomatic War in the South Pacific

President Roosevelt, who would eventually have a secret Map Room in the
White House to help him visualize this vast geo-political panorama, was also
convinced that the South Pacific mattered, especially New Caledonia. Located
about one thousand miles off Australia’s northeastern coast, and astride the sea
and air lines-of-communication between the United States and Australia, New
Caledonia became a destination point on the Pan American Airways Pacific
Clipper Service new southern route via Hawaii to New Zealand in 1940; the
northern route from San Francisco Bay, with intermediate stops in Hawaii,
Midway Island, Wake Island, and Guam en-route to Manila in the Philippines (all
U.S. possessions), had been pioneered in 1935.
The Japanese had also been paying attention to New Caledonia. A Japanese
consul was dispatched to New Caledonia in 1940 and soon took residence in
a fine house with a splendid view of Noumea Harbor. About 1,500 Japanese
citizens lived on the island, mostly as farmers and merchants in both urban and
rural areas; New Caledonian iron ore was being shipped to Japan by Japanese
mining interests. But the rarer, and strategically-important minerals nickel and
chrome, were mainstays of the island’s mining economy, and these were held
firmly by Western economic interests. And yet the West tread carefully in Asia
in 1940--neither Britain nor the United States answered the plea for help from
the Vichy governor-general of Indochina after Japan’s incursion into northern
Indochina in July 1940, a move that cut supply lines to Chiang Kai-shek’s military.
Only the Burma Road was left. No pretext could be given to Japan to launch a
pre-emptive strike, military or otherwise, and take control of New Caledonia as
it had in French Indochina; no Western power could have reversed such a dire
development in 1940-41.
Pan Am’s sea planes landed in New Caledonia’s Noumea Harbor, the most
developed shipping port in all of the South Pacific, another reason this was an
important point on America’s line-of-communication with Australia. And so the
shadow war played out in New Caledonia. In the same month, September 1940,
that the Axis powers inked the Tripartite Pact in Berlin, British colonial authorities
made the first move in New Caledonia. Hoping to help repeat de Gaulle’s success
in neighboring Tahiti, where a plebiscite had gone in favor of the Free French,
the British nudged New Caledonia toward their corner. While New Caledonia’s
urban colonial elite leaned toward Vichy France, it was its agrarian rural elite,
some of whom were descendants of the radical political prisoners sent from Paris
to Noumea after the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871, who supported in
word and deed de Gaulle’s Free French call.
In September 1940, these mostly rural New Caledonians rose up and forced a
capitulation of both Vichy French colonial and naval authorities. These men had
sought and received de Gaulle’s support in August. British authorities in London
and the South Pacific had yet to come to a firm position. But the arrival of a
Vichy French gunboat from Tahiti on 25 August 1940 forced their hand in August;
meanwhile in London a new agreement between Prime Minister Churchill and de
Gaulle was signed on 27 August. The British still had to convince Australia to act
on their behalf in the South Pacific. The Australian government, tentatively, and
finally definitively, approved the operation on 9 September 1940. Orchestrated
in part by British authorities, and approved and executed by Australia, the plot
began in the nearby colony of New Hebrides to the north of New Caledonia.
(British authorities had protected the French colonial authorities who supported
the Free French cause in the New Hebrides, an Anglo-French “co-dominion”
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shared-power colony.) An Australian
gunboat escorted the French Resident
Commissioner from the New Hebrides
to Noumea, where he was greeted
by the New Caledonians who had
“rallied” to de Gaulle’s Free French
call. The Vichy French gunboat from
Tahiti eventually sailed away, and the
one that had been dispatched from
Indochina was recalled. General de
Gaulle added New Caledonia to his
meager Free French portfolio.

A Shadow Diplomatic War in
New Caledonia

By the end of 1940, these three
small pieces of the French empire in
the Pacific were aligned with Britain
and America. And New Caledonia
was the largest and most strategically
important of these French possessions.
This was certainly the argument made
by the French naval officer in Saigon
who telegraphed his ideas to Vichy in
February 1941: dispatch a Vichy naval
expeditionary force to New Caledonia
and seize the renegade colony from
the grasp of the Free French. But no
action was taken and the shadow war
continued. A diplomatic consul from
the United States joined the Australian
representative who had arrived in
Noumea in August 1940 (An Australian
military party arrived in early 1941 to
assess New Caledonia’s defense needs
and its potential for air fields.)
The American consul carried
credentials granted by the Vichy French
embassy in Washington, D.C. Roosevelt
and de Gaulle still eyed one another with
caution as Roosevelt continued with his
“Vichy Gamble.” Ever mindful of the
tendency for imperialism to be a zerosum game, de Gaulle jealously guarded
all shards of Free French sovereignty
that he could. Looking to the post-war
future, he wanted to insure, as did his
Vichy foes, the long-term survival of
the entire French empire. The interests
of his metropolitan France, even if
only an aspirational government-inexile in London, were paramount.
Hints of de Gaulle’s anti-American
propensities, whenever he thought
French sovereignty or pride was at risk,
were evident from the beginning of this
often-contentious relationship between
the Free French and the Americans
around the globe.

And even New Caledonians, especially those in the
monied urban elite, were suspicious of this developing
relationship with both America and Australia. Despite New
Caledonia’s proximity to the coast of northeastern Australia,
it was part of the French empire. Its trade was largely within
the French imperial trading bloc, except for the Australian
coal needed to power its mining industries. Its flour and
butter came from France; some of its contracted labor
from northern Indochina. Without new trade agreements
with the British Commonwealth, especially Australia and
New Zealand, and the United States, the New Caledonian
economy would collapse. These re-orientations were
made. Australia began to sell food to New Caledonia;
Australia agreed to buy its nickel production, previously
sold to Germany via France. But Japan would challenge
this new status quo. It too needed New Caledonia’s nickel
production, especially after Japan lost access to the world’s
primary source of nickel, Canada, in 1940. Vichy authorities
in Indochina promised Japan these riches and more in July
1941, soon after Japan’s army had moved into southern
Indochina. The United States reacted immediately, freezing
Japanese assets in the United States, and suspending trade
with Japan.
The shadow war in the South Pacific was coming into
the light of day as the stakes were raised. In late September
1941, Britain convened a short conference of allies, including
the Free French National Committee represented by General
de Gaulle. Mindful of the increasing importance of his
Pacific colonies, de Gaulle offered the British access to New
Caledonia, its harbor, and its airfield-in-progress. American
military personnel had already been in New Caledonia
assessing its military assets, a mission taken without the
permission of the island’s Free French governor. Their
reports were sent back to Washington, D.C., where a recent
Harvard Ph.D. in French history, David Pinkney, had been
searching for information in the Library of Congress for a
two-hundred-page report on New Caledonia he wrote for
the Coordinator of Information, William J. Donovan, who
reported directly to President Roosevelt.

Empires in Collision in the South Pacific

The shadow war ended on 7 December 1941. Japan’s
attack on Pearl Harbor was coordinated with a much broader
attack on American, British, and Dutch imperial possessions
in Asia. In the first page of President Roosevelt’s first draft
of his famous “Date of Infamy” speech to Congress, written
hours after the attacks at Pearl Harbor, he placed this action
in the context of Japan “simultaneously” bombing “Hawaii
and the Philippines.” The President later mentioned
Malaya, penciled in Guam, and summarized: “Japan has
. . . undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout
the Pacific area.” Japan needed to control the United
States’ Philippine Islands in order to protect the line-ofcommunication with its so-called “Southern Resource” zone.
Resource-poor Japan needed much from British Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies. (Even the resource-rich United States
relied on rubber and tin from these colonies.)
And now the strategic importance of the South Pacific
for Japan came into focus for all too see. It was the flank

to Japan’s line-of-communication from southeast Asia to the
Home Islands that must be protected. On 23 January 1942,
Japan took Rabaul, a natural harbor with an airfield in New
Britain that would eventually have six airfields and be home
to over 100,000 Japanese. Rabaul, at the northern edge of
the Coral Sea, was about 1,600 miles from Noumea at the
southern edge of the Coral Sea, where the Australians had
been helping the New Caledonians fortify their defenses
and build an airfield since early 1941.
In a very deadly game, less akin to the dynamic game
of chess than the apparently static positional Asian game of
Go, moves and counter-moves were played very quickly;
the shadow war of 1940-41 had prepared the board. British
Hong Kong had fallen on Christmas Day; America’s
tiny Wake Island soon followed as President Roosevelt,
Prime Minister Churchill, and their military staffs debated
the strategy and tactics of global war at a closed-door
conference in Washington, D.C., in late 1941 and early 1942.
All agreed Hitler should be the priority. But America was
also especially concerned about the fate of the American,
British, and Dutch empires in Asia. Just after the first formal
meeting of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff at
the first Washington Conference of the war on 24 December,
de Gaulle’s Free French representative in Washington, D.C.,
reported a communication to the United States government
offering the “technical use of Free French airfields at New
Caledonia.” Could the British Commonwealth, the American
planners asked in the midst of the conference, defend
New Caledonia? After conferring with Commonwealth
authorities in Australia and New Zealand, the British
answer came quickly. Neither Australian nor New Zealand
could send re-enforcements to the Free French outpost in
the South Pacific, secured in September 1940 through the
machinations of Britain and a hesitant Australia, until the
middle of 1942.
And so the defense of New Caledonia--and most
strategists argued that it should be defended--would be
America’s temporary responsibility. Within twenty-four
hours the U.S. Army’s shipping experts came up with the
ships, including the four in New York already being loaded
with troops bound for the relief of British and American
troops in Iceland and North Ireland. The next day, 12
January 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill met at the White
House for the final decision-making meeting of the First
Washington Conference. The two men, as advised by their
military staffs, agreed to the immediate shipping shift from
Europe to the Pacific. The relief troops left their four ships,
and three more ships were made ready in haste. Ten days
after the White House meeting, and only six weeks after
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (and the same day the
Japanese took Rabaul), about twenty thousand Americans
were squeezed into seven ships about to pull out of the
Brooklyn Navy Yard to an unknown destination; (The
operation was highly classified; most of these men would
not find out their true destination until a few days before
they reached New Caledonia on 12 March 1942.)
The race was on. Designated Task Force 6814, these
seven American ships rendezvoused with another secret
task force (headed for Bora Bora in the south-central
15
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My Destiny With The Americal

Richard Sytsma
(As told to Les Hines and Dave Taylor)
(Editor’s note: This article is part 2 of remembrances of the author
while serving with 1st/20th Infantry Battalion of the 11th Light Infantry
Brigade as a Radio Telephone Operator (RTO). Part 1 appeared in the
Jan-Feb-Mar 2020 issue of the Americal Journal)

Raid on the Bicycles

Walter Walt peering out of the St.
Elena sick-bay porthole; Like General
Patch, who would later become the
Americal’s first commander, Walt
caught pneumonia, for him soon after
Task Force 6814 left New York. Shortly
after the St. Elena had passed through
the Panama Canal and reached the
Pacific, Walt had recovered.
Pacific) off the coast of South Carolina.
Together, these two convoys of ships
that had been quickly loaded with U.S.
Army forces, weapons, and equipment
headed for the Panama Canal. The
responsibility for escorting both task
forces as they zig-zagged across the
Pacific fell to the newly-appointed
Admiral Chester Nimitz, whose Pacific
Fleet had been stationed in Hawaii
since 1940. Admiral Nimitz dispatched
two fast-carrier task forces to the South
Pacific. As Task Force 6814 neared
Australia at the end of February, the
USS Lexington planned a diversionary
attack on Japanese forces at Rabaul.
But Japanese scout planes discovered
the task force and soon two waves of
bombers, eighteen in total, attacked the
Lexington in the first battle involving
carrier-type planes of the war on
20 February 1942. The men of the
Lexington cheered their pilots in the
air battle taking place over them. The
Lexington was saved, and resumed its
escorting of Task Force 6814, which
arrived safely in Melbourne on 26
February 1942. On their way across
the Pacific, the men of the St. Elena,
one of the ships of the task force, had
16

The Grace Lines’ St. Elena, a luxury liner with a South American route, was
hastily re-fitted as a troop ship. Corporal Walter Walt, with the St. Elena still
docked in the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 20 January 1942, wrote to his mother
just before midnight: “Well. Here starts adventure”
been given the short pamphlet Private Pillsbury Goes to Australia. What now?
Australia? For most of the men their stay in Australia would be very short indeed.
Task Force 6814 was under orders to embark once again as soon as possible. Most
men still did not where, or why.
The author enlisted in the U.S. Air Force (1970-1974) and served a tour of duty in
northern Thailand in 1973. He teaches Chinese history and “WWII: The Pacific War” at
Western Washington University. He would like to thank Walter Walt’s son Christopher,
and his daughter Melissa, for permission to use their father’s World War II letter-diaries,
photos, and ephemera in this project.

The threat of Japanese sea-and-air attacks kept Task Force 6814’s track to
Melbourne well south of the area displayed on this map. Admiral Nimitz’s
fast-carrier task forces, however, challenged Japan in the South Pacific in
early 1942.

The area around LZ Liz was always ripe for enemy activity. That’s
because Highway 515 ran north of our hill and the enemy used that road
as a resupply route to support the NVA in the mountains. We would
monitor that area all night long and fire artillery to try to interdict
their resupply efforts. There was hilly terrain around LZ Liz (not the
triple canopy jungle we had around LZ Cork, but plenty of cover
and concealment) and so the NVA and VC could move quite a bit of
equipment and troops.
We would also put recon out there all the time to try to interdict
the enemy’s resupply efforts. We got word from MACV who told
our battalion commander the enemy was using bicycles, mopeds and
motorcycles from the hamlets to move supplies up and down Highway
551. So we landed next to some hamlets on the commander’s bird and he
told me to confiscate all the bikes, motorcycles, etc. and bring them back
up the hill. I told him I would need to get some help so I got some recon
platoon friends and we loaded everything we could find in the ville’s

Battalion Recon Platoon member enjoying one
of the confiscated bikes on LZ Liz.

onto the commanders bird and
it made numerous trips hauling
that stuff up to LZ Liz. I guess we
hauled about 80-100 bikes, etc. up
to our LZ.
The next day the village chief
of those hamlets was at the gate,
claiming we took their livelihood
away. The battalion commander
was not having any of it. We
took them all of them over to the
artillery side of LZ Liz and blew
them up.

Rembering LZ’s

LZ Dragon was another place
we were on from time to time. It
seems that everyone made it up to
that LZ. We had to cross a large and
wet rice paddy east of the coast to
get to it. Of course we would get
sniper fire as we crossed because
of our slow movement, which
hastened us along. Once we got up
to the beach-type terrain we would
find a lot of spider-holes and other

Dick Sytsma enjoying one of the finer
motorcycles confiscated.
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